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1The International Association for the Study of Common Property, created following the
formation of a U.S. National Academy of Sciences Panel on Common Property Resources, is
one indication of the level of interest in this issue.  The Association now includes over 4,000
individual and organizational members in 153 countries.
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Common Property and Collective Action:
Cooperative Watershed Management in Haiti
Introduction
The debate over common property among development professionals is increasingly
active.  This includes the growing concern for international environmental disputes and
transboundary externalities and questions as to the appropriate role of self-governance in
resource management.  Growing numbers of theorists and practitioners question the
application of the "tragedy of the commons" paradigm to resource overuse, yet a broader
and more elaborate theory of common property is only now emerging.
1  A series of
theoretical efforts have drawn attention to the possibility (but by no means the
universality) of cooperative behavior in resource regimes (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and
Dion, 1988; Bromley, 1989, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Runge, 1981, 1984; Young, 1982).  Yet the
systematic empirical examination of the factors responsible for successful collective action is
relatively recent (e.g., Wade, 1988; Tang, 1992).  Such empirical analyses can help inform
policy makers when and where collective action and self-governance can work.  In this
paper, we undertake such an examination in a region widely deemed to be one of the least2
auspicious environments for voluntary collective action in the world:  rural Haiti.  If
common property management can function effectively here, it would be reasonable to
suppose that it can succeed in more favorable environments.
The paper is divided into four sections.  First, watershed management in Haiti is
presented as a problem of voluntary collective action in which small watersheds are the
common responsibility of a group of users.  Second, this situation is given formal expression
as a "public goods" problem, in which obligations to contribute time and labor to the
maintenance and management of watersheds are treated as conditional or contingent
commitments to cooperate (rather than defect).  Third, an empirical analysis is presented
in which key economic and cultural factors are tested to determine those that best explain
the individual propensity to cooperate and the conditions necessary for collective action to
emerge.  Fourth, we interpret these results in light of the model, and suggest some
generalizations and extensions of theoretical and empirical research on common property
and collective action.
1.  Watershed Management in Haiti
1.1  History of Watershed Management
Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere, and one of the most
environmentally degraded.  Deforestation and soil erosion began in the colonial period,
when forests were cleared for coffee and sugar cane production, and have continued to the
present day.  In response, the government, since 1826, has legislated over 100 laws and
policies aimed at protecting natural forests and soils.  These laws have taken the form of3
taxes, prohibitions, and penalties (Pierre Louis, 1989).  This legislation has apparently not
provided incentives or conditions for appropriate land use decisions, and degradation has
been little affected.  With the failure of policy instruments, aid agencies and the
government of Haiti, since the early 1950s, have directed their resources and attention to
the implementation of reforestation, soil conservation and watershed management projects. 
The vast majority have also produced disappointing results failing to result in sustained
adoption and improved productivity (AID, 1990; BREDA, 1988; Murray, 1979).  Such
efforts were characterized by large-scale treatments of contiguous land and ravines and the
provision of monetary and commodity incentives to attract peasant participation; a
disregard for individual landholder knowledge or techniques; and indifference to socio-
cultural institutions and land tenure complexities (Lilin and Koohafkan, 1987).
Given this legacy of failure, a new approach to watershed management began to
emerge in the early 1980s, based on individual incentives and their agricultural parcels
(STABV, 1990).  The new approach recognized that:
1. farmer remuneration was not necessary for technique adoption and sometimes
even acted against technique maintenance and diffusion;
2. a number of low input, indigenous, anti-erosion techniques and agroforestry
practices existed which could be improved upon, and;
3. peasants had a natural incentive to conserve soil in order to increase agricultural
production.
This approach has proved more successful.  Numerous farmers have voluntarily adopted
and maintained soil conservation measures in diverse areas of Haiti.  The approach takes a4
farmer rather than an engineering perspective of soil erosion, and views watersheds
primarily as a set of agricultural parcels within a physically defined space rather than as
one contiguous physical unit.  However, implementation of this approach does not resolve
problems of erosion which cross private property boundaries, occurs between two private
boundaries, or in public domain lands.  These "transboundary" erosion issues multiply
with growing land subdivision as ridges and gullies are increasingly used to delineate
boundaries.  Unless such erosion is treated, the agricultural parcel approach does not result
in improved overall levels of agricultural production and environmental rehabilitation.
1.2  Watersheds as Common Property
A watershed is an area drained by a single water course system.  The watershed is
thus a functional unit established by physical relationships where upstream land use can
incite a chain of environmental impacts affecting downstream areas.  The fundamental
problem of watershed management is that water flows downhill, irrespective of political
boundaries.  This trans-boundary water flow is an externality, that can be either positive
(adding to the value of downstream areas) or negative.  Another key characteristic of
watersheds is that they hold multiple, interconnected natural resources: soil, water and
vegetation.  Impacts on one resource invariably affect the status of others, suggesting that
these externalities are generally nonseparable.
In essence, watersheds are physically defined subsets of rural society, and watershed
management is a question of social relations and coordination between individual vested 5
interests.  Since their productivity is a result of by upstream action, downstream holders
seek to influence upstream landholders' behavior.  If landholders coordinate land use, then
each can operate to optimize their land's productivity.  A failure to cooperate results in a
Pareto-inferior outcome.
Landholder exposure to externalities is predominantly a function of their location in
the watershed.  As illustrated in Figure 1, most of the upstream landholders (a, b and d) are
not effected by the land use of others.  Midstream landholders (c, e, g and h) are effected by
upstream actions, and the holder of the most downstream position (i) is theoretically the
most vulnerable of all.  Landholders e and g would be effected by f's land use due to surface
flow of water and or soil.
From Figure 1, landholder i would seem to have the greatest incentive to induce
watershed treatments because of his/her location, while holders a, b, and d are more
favorably situated and have less obvious incentives to do so.  If c and e (who are the most
exposed to gully erosion) decide to install treatments to reduce erosion, then all those
downstream (g, h, and i) will benefit.  If downstream users do so without assisting c and e
to establish the treatments, then they are "free riding".
As mentioned previously, a demand has emerged for development approaches which
build on the success of the agricultural parcel approach yet explicitly target transboundary
erosion.  This involves finding an appropriate combination of private incentives respecting
individual parcels, and public incentives for transboundary problems.  Such an approach6
also must promote a combination of landholder land use agreements and independent
landholder action, and collective agreements and collective action to reduce transboundary
soil losses.  Both require landholder cooperation and thus new program strategies and
policy approaches to encourage that cooperation.
1.3  Prospects for Collective Management
These problems of cooperation and questions as to the appropriate role of projects in
encouraging cooperation revolve around a central issue:  Under what conditions is
voluntary collective action best maintained in watershed management?  For the Haitian
farmer, this involves an individual choice:  whether to participate in a voluntary watershed
management scheme (cooperate) or not to participate (defect).  But the sum of these
individual choices has collective consequences:  insufficient participation leads to
inadequate watershed management of an agricultural parcel and environmental
degradation, while sufficient participation yields joint benefits in the form of reduced
erosion and increased productivity in which the individual shares.  There is thus an
individual and collective component to the problem, making it one of "public goods"
provision, in which the public good is the watershed itself.
Such problems have traditionally been described as "tragedies of the commons," in
which too many people who "free ride", overly concerned with their own benefit, have
ruined their common environment.  This explanation has been popular in Haiti, where
experts have categorically characterized Haitians as having extremely limited identification
with any purpose greater than self or family survival and aggrandizement.  Haitians are     
2In the OAS's first "Inventory of Information Basic to the Planning of Agricultural
Development in Latin America:  Haiti," the statement "no farmers' organization in the ordinary
sense exist in Haiti" comprises the entire chapter titled "Farmers Organizations."  OAS, 1963.
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also noted for their historic opposition to authority and the high value placed on economic
freedom (de Young, 1958).  USAID's first major report on the human resources of Haiti,
written in 1962, concluded that the peasant "except under extreme duress, is incapable of
group action to defend his interests" (Schaedel, 1962:iii).  These characterizations, in
essence that individuals are prone to defection and would "free ride" at every opportunity,
have strongly influenced environmental policies and development project strategies alike.
2
Yet, anthropologists have long recognized that indigenous cooperative institutions are
widespread in rural Haiti and have argued for their integration into development
strategies.  Many other authors and development workers have cited the need to recognize
and empower local, labor exchange groups in natural resource projects in order to facilitate
cooperation.  Cernea (1989) has called for watershed management approaches which form
"watershed groups" (groups of farmers based on land ownership within watersheds) to
establish and maintain watershed and forestry treatments.  In a similar vein, Murray
(1990) has promoted the establishment of "hillside units" of Haitian farmers to collaborate
on the treatment of contiguous watershed lands.  Uphoff (1986) also recommends the
recognition and promotion of local groups for watershed management.  McKean (1984)
states that the though limited, the literature from Japan shows that collective management
is capable of assuring stable and productive use of watersheds over a long period of time. 
None of the above authors have explicitly proposed methods to form such groups, or
discussed requisite incentive structures for farmer participation.8
In sum, there is consensus in the literature of the failure of conventional approaches
and that the achievement of watershed management requires the maintenance of
cooperative institutions.  But understanding such institutions, how they might be
identified, evolve, or be promoted, is limited.  How is a balance of incentives to free ride or
cooperate arrived at, and what factors tip this balance in one direction or the other? 
When, and at what level, are externally provided incentives or coercion necessary?  In
order to develop improved theories concerning the emergence of cooperative institutions
for watershed management, there is a need to understand these factors.  A number of basic
questions arise:  What economic incentives do landholders have to participate?  How does
this incentive vary with landholding position in the watershed?  What social or cultural
attributes are correlated with watershed cooperation or defection?  Research into these
questions was conducted at the Save the Children Federation (SCF) Watershed
Management Project in Maissade, Haiti, which has utilized a cooperative watershed
management approach since 1988.  Before examining the project in detail, we first consider
five key theoretical issues.
2.  Theoretical Issues in Collective Action
Whether to cooperate through voluntary contributions to a public good, or to defect
by failing to contribute, in a central problem in social and economic theory.  In the case of
watershed management, the problem is one in which the sum of individual decisions affects
the welfare of the group as a whole.  The theoretical components of the problem may be
reduced to five:9
(2.1) the nonseparable costs of watershed management;
(2.2) the critical role of expectations and contingent choice;
(2.3) the collective public consequences of individual behavior; 
(2.4) the redistributive function of shared responsibilities;
(2.5) the survival capacity of the watershed management institution.
These theoretical issues will be presented and discussed in turn.
2.1  Nonseparable Costs
Watershed management decisions generally involve certain nonseparabilities.  If a
farmer attempts to maximize benefits from a watershed in which the actions of other
watershed users matters (such as those upstream) then only by establishing some level of
security concerning these actions will a rational choice be well-defined (Runge, 1981).
Formally, let the cost functions of two farmers (1, 2) who share the watershed be given
by C1 (q1, q2) and C2 (q1, q2) where q1 and q2 are the quantities of a composite input of
labor time and maintenance effort offered by farmers 1 and 2 respectively.  If the function
is separable, then the profit maximizing rule for each is to set price equal to marginal cost,
which involves only the argument of the farmers' own labor time and maintenance effort. 
Such an example would occur where no transboundary effects affect the calculus, as in the
functions:










where A and B and superscripts n, m, r and s are parameters.10
Profit maximization would then imply that price be set equal to marginal cost.  First order
conditions (assuming second order conditions are satisfied) are:


























Note that for farmer 1, only q1 enters the first order conditions, which is his own labor and
maintenance, and likewise for farmer 2, whose decision is based on variations in q2.
But if transboundary affects do affect this calculus, they generally take the
nonseparable form.  For example:












Profit maximization by each individual would then imply the following first order
conditions:11
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Here the first-order conditions include not only the farmers own actions, but the other
farmers' actions as well.  Hence, farmer 1 cannot define an optimal level of labor time and
maintenance effort solely in terms of his own labor effort (q1), but must also consider
farmer 2's labor effort (q2) as well.  The reverse is true for farmer 2.  Each farmer's
optimum investment is based on the actions expected of the other.  Most, if not all,
externalities of interest take this nonseparable form.
2.2  Expectations and Contingent Choice
The implication of nonseparability is that expectations of the behavior of other farmers
matters, since if farmer 1 does not know what level of labor time and maintenance effort to
expect from farmer 2 (q2), his optimal labor time and effort cannot be determined.  Since
watershed management rules or institutions help define these expectations, the willingness
to cooperate is built on this institutional structure (see Bromley, 1991).  If expectations did12
not matter, a "dominant strategy" would exist for each farmer, as in the separable case
(Runge, 1981).  If this strategy were to defect, the situation would reduce to a prisoners'
dilemma (PD) game, and the equilibrium outcome would always be mutual defection,
equivalent to the provision of inadequate labor and maintenance to keep up the benefits of
watershed management.  But where the actions of one farmer are conditional or contingent
on his expectations of the actions of others, multiple outcomes are possible, including either
joint cooperation or joint defection, at varying levels of labor and maintenance.  In these
cases, the problem is assurance concerning these actions and of the reciprocated investment
of labor, time and effort in managing the watershed.  This assurance problem (AP) has
been contrasted to the prisoners dilemma (PD) (Sen, 1967; Runge, 1981, 1984).
Schelling (1973) has proposed a graphical representation of this problem which
illustrates a wide variety of possible outcomes, depending on the nature of mutual
expectations involved, and the implied institutional framework (see Appendix A). 
Watershed institutions internalize nonseparable externalities common to the group. 
Watershed management rules coordinating the resource use of villagers can be thought of
as a search for "coordination norms," to use Schelling's (1960) phrase.  These norms are
endogenous adaptive responses to the demand for scarce information about the likely
behavior of others:  that is, the management scheme specifies the labor time and
maintenance expected by farmer 1 of farmer 2 (q2) and vice versa (q1).  By providing the
assurance that others will not misuse common resources, such watershed management
institutions can make it rational for the individual to respect them.  Although expectations
of wide-spread free rider behavior may be quite likely to provoke a corresponding     
3Axelrod (1984), Taylor (1976), and Hardin (1982) have shown that cooperation is
consistent with self-interested behavior, even inside the PD framework, if repeated plays are
allowed.  Repeating the game opens the door to expectations of others' behavior.  The
conditions for cooperation then turn on whether the players are sufficiently forward looking and
formulate a "tit-for-tat" rule motivated by expectations of others' cooperation and fear of
retaliation in the case of noncooperation.  Similarly, Sugden (1982, 1984) has noted that a
"principle of reciprocity" may operate in actual situations of collective choice (see below).  This
principle does not say that one must always contribute or cooperate, but that one must not free
ride while others are contributing.  The individual villager has obligations to the group from
whose efforts he derives benefits.  The model of reciprocity which Sugden develops is based on
commitment to a rule of behavior, conditional on the expectation that a sufficiently large group
of others will adhere to it too.  This is the same concept as the "critical mass" discussed above.
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response, leading to a downward spiral of overuse, it is also possible for institutions to
promote a critical mass of resource conserving behavior.
3
Schelling's analysis, when applied to watershed management (indeed, all public goods)
suggests that neither free riding nor cooperation are likely always to be a dominant
strategy.  In the past decade, a growing number of descriptive studies (e.g., McKean, 1984;
Wade, 1988; and Tang, 1992) support this claim, and have shown that collective action can
successfully manage a wide variety of resources, but is also capable of breakdown.  The key
observation is that both cooperation and defection emerge from the construction and
breakdown of a variety of different rules or norms which vary from group to group,
watershed to watershed, and society to society.
There is thus no theoretical basis for supposing, a priori, that either individual
cooperation or defection are universally dominant strategies.  Moreover, the incentives
facing farmer 1 will probably be different than those facing farmer 2.  Whether cooperation
or defection predominates in a watershed or elsewhere is determined by those forces which
change the individual payoff to various types of behavior.  The sum of these individuals'
behavior determines the overall benefits and costs of maintaining the 14
watershed at a given level.  These benefits are likely to be both economic and social in
nature, the result of conditions affecting the entire group of individuals in a watershed.
2.3  Collective Consequences of Individual Behavior
The link from individual incentives to collective economic and social consequences may
be described as a public goods problem, following Sugden (1984), in which reciprocal
obligations to cooperate are conditional on the expected behavior of others, and succeed in
providing watershed management only insofar as they assure that all will "do their part." 
This assurance problem (AP) reflects both the nonseparability of choice and the problems
of expectations explored above.
Let the individual welfare of farmer i be (Wi), an increasing function of his individual
benefits from watershed management.  The total gains of such watershed management are
the public good z and are shared collectively.  The individual farmer, farmer i, has
decreasing welfare in the labor time and maintenance effort put into the watershed (qi) but
increasing welfare in the benefits such management provides him and the group of users as
a whole (z), of which his share (zi) is a part.  In addition to the environmental and financial
gains, there are social gains from individual participation and penalties for defection that
are important both in and beyond the watershed.
We hypothesize that a group of farmers can sustain a watershed management scheme
through "conditional commitments."  Well-defined obligations exist to a group to which
one belongs and from which one derives benefits.  Such commitments do not stipulate that
a group member always cooperates by contributing time and maintenance.  They say only
that if others in a well-defined group are contributing what is judged a "fair share," then a
group member is obliged to do the same.  It should be noted that individuals may belong to15
several such groups simultaneously, and that the benefits may extend beyond the issue of
watershed management.  This issue will become relevant in the empirical section below.
Let the welfare Wi of each farmer i in the watershed be an increasing function of his
gains from watershed management measured by z, and a decreasing function of labor time
and maintenance effort.  Hence:
Wi = Wi(qi, z) (i = 1, .... n) (1)
If hi(qi, z) is the marginal rate of substitution between z and qi then by definition:
hi(qi, z) =  – (* *Wi/* *qi)/(* *Wi/* *z) (i = 1, .... n) (2)
Two additional restrictions, reasonable for one good (gains from watershed
management) and one bad (labor time and maintenance effort) are:
* *hi(qi, z)/* *qi > 0 (i = 1, .... n) (3)
and
* *hi(qi, z)/* *z > 0 (i = 1, .... n) (4)
Total gains from watershed management are a function of the resources devoted to
maintaining the watershed by individual farmers.  The "production function" for the
watershed is thus the weighted sum of individual farmers' time and effort spent to maintain
it.16
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The function f(@ @) is assumed continuous, increasing and concave (or linear in the limit). 
The parameter " "i (a positive constant) is the "weight" or impact on the watershed of
different farmers' actions, on the assumption that equal time and effort need not have an
equal impact.  This opens the possibility of disproportionate contributions or damages by
certain farmers to the watershed, such as upstream users, or steep slopes.  If these users
substantially increased their maintenance time and effort, for example, the impact on total
gains from the watershed (z) would be disproportionately felt.  Now define a total
contribution function F(@ @) for a given level of farmer efforts ¯ q = (qi, ... qn) by a group G and
a given level of total labor time and maintenance effort J J, such that where J J $ $ 0,
F (G, J J) = f ( E E   " "jJ J + E E  " "k qk) (6)
                         j, ,G        k, , * *G
This says that for any group of farmers G, and level of labor time and maintenance effort J J
$ $ 0, F(G, J J) is the gain from watershed management that would result if every member of a
group in the watershed j had contributed to its management through time and effort J J,
taking as given the contribution of non-members, with each non-member k contributing qk. 
(This function must be continuous, increasing and concave in J J.)  For this group, given the
contributions of non-members qk, let qi
G be the value of J J that maximizes welfare Wi[J J,
F(G, J J)].     
4The following formal definitions may be stated (Sugden, 1984, p. 777):
Obligations.  For any vector of contributions ¯ q, for any group G, and for any group member i, i
is meeting his obligation to G if and only if either (a) qi $ qi
G or (b) for some other agent j in G,
qi $ qj.
Equilibrium.  An equilibrium is a vector of contributions ¯ q such that for each farmer i, given the
contributions of other farmers, qi is the smallest contribution that is compatible with all of i's
obligations.
     
5Sugden (1984) proves these results for the case of homogeneous agents.  Where agents
are heterogeneous, the results are qualitatively the same, but the assurance problem is
exacerbated, as discussed below.
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If each farmer i could choose a welfare-maximizing level of labor time and
maintenance effort for the each member of the group, qi
G is the level he or she would
choose.  The principle of reciprocity says that farmer i is obligated to contribute qi
G,
conditional on every other member of G doing the same.
4  If farmers pursue self-interest
subject to these obligations, then they will make the smallest contribution to watershed
maintenance that is compatible with their obligations to all groups of which they are a
member, including to themselves, the group G = {i}.  Hence, pure self-interest is allowed
expression, since every farmer has an obligation to contribute at least as much (or as little)
labor time and maintenance effort as self-interest requires.
The essential features of this model are that (a) equilibrium exists; (b) it is not
necessarily unique; (c) one equilibrium is Pareto-Optimal -- the Samuelsonian one in which
the marginal rate of substitution between qi and z is equal to the marginal rate of
transformation; (d) every other equilibrium involves undersupply of watershed
management.
5  These Pareto-inefficient equilibria, in which watershed management is
insufficient, are due to the fact that not enough farmers "do their part" in terms of labor
time and effort.     
6If the problem were a multiperson prisoners' dilemma (PD), rather than an assurance
problem (AP), then no farmer would increase his time and effort, even if every other farmer did. 
Defection would be a dominant strategy.  In the AP, there is no dominant strategy.
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If insufficient labor time and effort is expended to maintain a watershed, the theory
outlined here suggests the assurance problem (AP) as an important explanation.  Failed
management schemes are those in which every farmer would increase his time and effort if
only he were assured that others would do so too (Sen, 1967; Runge, 1981, 1984).
6  This
does not suggest that the problem of watershed management will be solved -- only that it
can be solved.  In theory, even if farmers had identical preferences, reciprocal obligations
could break down in the face of the assurance problem.  This breakdown is even more
likely where farmers have widely varying preferences and attitudes (Sugden, 1984, p. 783).
Of course, whether the AP explains watershed management better than some other
model is ultimately an empirical question.  Nonetheless, the above theory suggests that the
reciprocal obligations defined by a watershed management institution are an important
basis for improved resources use.  One of the important predictions generated by the
theory is that if farmer 1's labor time and maintenance effort is at a minimum, an increase
will be likely to bring about an increase in other's contributions as well.  The model also
predicts that larger and more heterogeneous groups will find higher levels of provision
more difficult than smaller and more homogeneous groups.  This is so because the AP
(which is fundamentally a problem of information acquisition about the likely behavior of
others) becomes more difficult to solve when agents are diffuse and dissimilar (see Runge,
1984).  But group size is only one aspect of the problem of information acquisition.  Group
size is typically compounded by the increasing heterogeneity of the parties' interests.  The
model predicts that the AP is more easily solved by smaller and more homogeneous groups,19
in which the relevant "n," and thus the relevant "critical mass," is smaller.  This generates
the corollary prediction that large groups may break themselves into smaller, more
homogeneous units in order to resolve difficult issues of watershed management, and may
eliminate or purge noncooperating members from group status.
2.4  Redistribution and Shared Responsibility
The willingness to cooperate by participating actively in watershed management has
been described thusfar as a form of conditional commitment, in which farmer i will
cooperate if institutional arrangements make the payoff from collective action and the
assurance that a critical number of others will also cooperate sufficient.  But is this purely a
matter of maximizing behavior, or is there also a redistributive function served by water
management institutions?
Becker (1976) has argued that in closely knit groups (such as families), individuals
may actually be willing to suboptimize in the short-run, if they are assured that others will
redistribute to them over time.  Thus, even if cooperating with a watershed management
scheme is less than optimal from a short-run maximizing perspective, the assurance that its
benefits will be redistributed (even if in the long-run) can make it a superior strategy.
This may be shown with the aid of a diagram (see Figure 2).  Let farmer 1 be an
upstream watershed user who participates in a management scheme, even though some
benefits go to downstream participants, such as farmer 2.  Farmer 1 may even be outside
the watershed altogether, but may contribute labor time and maintenance effort, in the
expectation that reciprocal rewards from farmer 2 may be forthcoming.
Let X1 be farmers 1's income and let X2 be farmer 2's income.  Farmer 2's indifference20
curve is U2.  Let QQ by the joint productive opportunity locus for both farmers.  If farmer
1 selfishly maximizes his opportunity by choosing point R*, he maximizes income in the
short run but devotes no time or effort to maintaining the watershed.  If instead some time
and effort went to this collective good, and he were to suboptimize and choose J*, then
farmer 2, starting from J*, could redistribute income resulting from the gains of watershed
management along locus TT to a point, such as A*.  Such redistribution might be an
explicit part of the management scheme, or simply a favor done or due.  At A*, both farmer
1 and 2 are better off than they would have been at R*, because of income increases due to
watershed improvement, plus the rewards of sharing behavior.  In short, for farmer 1 to
participate in the watershed management scheme can be a superior strategy even if
somewhat inefficient, if farmer 2 reciprocates by redistributing some of the gains to farmer
1.22
Several conditions must be met to make this scheme work.  (1) Farmer 2 must be able
at J* to have enough income or resources to make the transfer to farmer 1 at A*.  (2)
Farmer 2's indifference curves must reflect a preference for this type of redistribution;
their shape must allow a move to a point northeast of R*, for the result to be mutually
beneficial.  At B*, for example, farmer 2 redistributes, but the result is insufficient to lead
to an improvement for farmer 1.  At C*, farmer 2 "overcompensates," making farmer 1
much better off, but farmer 2 actually worse off, than at R*.  (3) Farmer 2 must act "last,"
or sequentially, in relation to farmer 1, who acts as a leader.
However, even these conditions are enlightening.  The first condition says that the
farmers in a watershed management scheme must have a minimum level of resources to
make such redistribution Pareto-optimal.  Without this minimum, self-interested defection
may indeed be a dominant strategy.  The second condition says that there is an optimal
degree of watershed "group spiritedness" (or reciprocity), reflected in preferences leading
to outcomes such as A*.  Too little such spirit leads to outcomes such as B*, too much to
outcomes such as C*, both strictly Pareto-inferior to A*.  Condition (3) again implies a
form of AP, arising from the nonseparable interests and reciprocity required for successful
watershed management.  If farmers 2 is assured that farmer 1 will choose J*, allocating a
portion of his labor time and maintenance effort to watershed management, rather than
self-interested defection at R*, then his own preferences are more likely to be in favor of
redistribution, rather than self-seeking.  Only if farmer 1 is assured that farmer 2 will
redistribute, following his lead to maintain the watershed, will he be inclined to choose J*
rather than R*.
2.5  Group Survival as a Dynamic Choice23
A final issue concerns which watershed management groups survive over time.  Here
we draw on some recent work by Hirshleifer (1985) and Hamilton (1964).   The biological
basis of sharing behavior within kin-groups is, of course, the perpetuation of a set of
genetic characteristics.  While this argument applies on a biological basis to those with
similar genetic make-ups, it may also be applied to those whose similarity is not genetic but
social, political, or cultural.  Hence, joint use of a watershed may reflect kinship ties, or a
more general set of social, political, or religious affiliations.  If groups that emphasize rules
of reciprocal obligation actually prosper vis-a-vis those that do not, then the trait is
reinforced.
As noted above, the degree of group homogeneity reinforces reciprocal behavior that
is Pareto-optimal, and reduces the assurance problem.  If preferences for redistribution
between farmer 1 and farmer 2 are similar, cooperative solutions are more likely to emerge. 
It is more likely that these differences will be less, and the propensity to reciprocate greater,
among individuals with similar preferences.  This homogeneity may be conferred by class,
culture, community, religion, or country, to name but a few in an infinite set of possible
homogeneity/heterogeneity distinctions.     
7Groupman are peasant groupings established upon traditional social linkages.  The groups
commonly engage in collective social and economic activities and average eight members.
     
8See Appendix B, Tables B-1 and B-2 for summary data on watershed characteristics and
management activity.
     
9The "completely treated" watershed category includes those in which the principal ravine is
treated from the uppermost parcel to the most downstream parcel.  The "partial" category
includes those in which more than one checkdam has been constructed on more than one
parcel.  The "scant" category includes those watersheds in which less than 10 treatments have
been installed on one or fewer parcels.
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3.  An Empirical Analysis of Watershed Management
3.1  Research Setting, Objectives and Methods
In 1986 Save the Children Federation (SCF), with financing from USAID, initiated a
pilot, Integrated Watershed Management project in Maissade, Haiti.  Project planners
combined two new, yet apparently successful extension approaches.  The first was the
formation of groupman for peasant mobilization
7 and community development activities. 
Second, economic benefit-oriented tree planting and soil conservation was to be promoted. 
Following 2 years of successful intervention at the individual farm level, the project
initiated a small watershed treatment program.  The purpose of the program was to
encourage (1) the voluntary treatment of small degraded watersheds (averaging 9 hectares)
and (2) the creation of new watershed specific management institutions.  After 2 years of
activity in 22 watersheds, a total of 590 checkdams were constructed with an average of 27
checkdams constructed per watershed.
8  Principal ravines were completely treated in 10
watersheds, partial treatment was achieved in 7 and only scant treatment was achieved in 5
watersheds.
9  Checkdams were constructed on the lands of 49 percent of all landholders. 
An average of 3 checkdams were constructed per land holding.25
Of all landholders, 54 percent participated by voluntarily contributing labor time and
effort to watershed management.  An average of 4.6 landholders participated per
watershed.  An average of 3.7 individuals who did not own land in the watersheds also
participated per watershed.  These individuals are referred to as the "non-watershed"
group participants in the following text, and correspond to "nongroup members" in the
model above.  The number of landholder person/work events averaged 32.2 per watershed,
and the number of non-watershed person/work events averaged 18.5.  Thus, an average of
57 percent of all person/work events were contributed by individuals without lands in the
watershed.
The first objective of the field research was to gain a greater understanding of the
factors associated with individual choice to cooperate or defect in the collective watershed
management activity described above.  Why did some individuals cooperate and others
not?  The second objective is to investigate the affect of resource scale and variable
heterogeneity on the emergence of the collective watershed management institutions.  Why
was there a high degree of cooperation in some watersheds and not in others?
Various survey instruments were utilized to acquire information in a short period of
time, as well as to permit cross-referencing.  These instruments were implemented by the
first author with the assistance of the SCF staff of agroforestry technicians and animators
(peasant organizers) during August, September and December, 1990.  Field data was
compiled in database form and included 19 socio-economic parameters for each of the
landowners of the 22 watersheds studied, and for each of the activity participants (n = 268). 
The landowners were divided into those who participated (n = 101) and those who did not     
10For a more complete treatment of the selective incentives, hypotheses and results see
White (1992).
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(n = 85).  Another category was comprised of the participants who did not own land in the
watershed (n = 82).  This data was assessed in terms of selective individual incentives for
participation and the conditions for collective action.  Hypotheses and discussion for the
two sets of analyses follow.
3.2  Selective Incentives:  Factors Associated With Individual Choice to Cooperate
10
The first objective was to determine which types of individuals participate, which do
not, and why.  As the role of "non-watershed" group participation became apparent, it also
became imperative to understand who these contributors were and what incentive they had
to participate in the watershed treatment.  The compiled data and summaries of the
statistical analyses of the factors influencing participation are presented in Appendix B
Tables B.3, B.4, and B.5.  
In order to fulfill this first objective, the following factors were compared between
participant (cooperator) and non-participant (defector) populations to determine
differences and correlation with cooperation:
(a) Potential to directly benefit economically due to individual exposure to trans-
boundary erosion.  This factor is indicated by landholding position in the watershed
(sideslope, upstream, midstream, downstream) and length of principal ravine on
individual's land holding.     
11Direct economic benefit is indicated by checkdam construction on an individual's land. 
Because of rapid sediment accumulation, checkdam installation results in the establishment of
an enriched, micro-site for cropping higher-valued crops.
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(b) Actual relationship between individual effort and realization of direct economic
benefit.  This factor is indicated by the location and number of checkdams
constructed, and whether their location is commensurate with individual
participation.  
(c) Land tenure of agricultural parcel held in the watershed. 
(d) Individual's religious affiliation.  This factor is indicated by two variables: official
religious affiliation (Catholic or Protestant) and participation in voodoo ceremonies.
(e) Individual's wealth.  This factor is indicated by total number and size of lands held,
and the number of cows and pigs owned.
(f) Individual's membership in groupman, and the manner in which the individual
acquires labor for major agricultural tasks.
(g) Age of the individual. 
(h) Individual's prior adoption of soil conservation techniques.
(a) Potential Gain:  Landholder Exposure to Trans-boundary Erosion and Potential for
Direct Economic Benefit
11
Payoffs in the form of direct economic benefits are generally argued to be a prime
motivation for participation in collective action.  The potential for landholders to
experience direct economic benefit from watershed management is indicated by
landholding position in the watershed (sideslope, upstream, midstream, downstream) and
length of principal ravine on an individual's land holding.  Following the logic presented in
the introductory section, we hypothesized that individuals whose lands were in the
upstream and sideslope position would participate less than those with landholdings in the28
mid- and down-stream positions.  Similarly, individuals who own lands in the mid- and
down-stream position were hypothesized to participate to a greater degree because they
have both the most to gain from watershed treatment activity, and the most to lose from
inactivity.  Finally, individuals with greater lengths of ravine are hypothesized to
participate to a greater degree than those who own no ravine because more checkdams
would be built on their land, and thus they have more to gain from cooperation.
The null hypotheses that participants and non-participants owned the same proportion
of parcel position types (sideslope, up-, mid- and down-stream) and owned the same length
of ravine was rejected (see Table B.4).
Participants tended to own greater lengths of ravine than non-participants (68 meters
versus 55 meters).  The majority of participants held either up-stream or mid-stream
positions (67 percent), while the majority of non-participants held sideslope or down-
stream positions (63 percent).  This influence is not absolute; 34 percent of participants
held sideslope or down-stream positions, while 36 percent of non-participants held up- or
mid-stream positions.  These findings counter the hypothesis that individuals with down-
stream holdings would disproportionately participate because of their enhanced exposure
to risk and potential to benefit.  This finding is discussed again in succeeding sections.  But
these findings do support the claim that those whose "weight" is greatest in terms of
exposure to the externality, and conversely, potential to gain from watershed management. 
The up- and mid-stream landholder thus functioned as "leaders."29
(b) Actual Gain:  Relationship between Individual Effort and Realization of Direct Benefit
Conventional wisdom among watershed management planners in Haiti predicts that
individuals would not voluntarily contribute by working on (i.e., treating) non-participant
lands.  This view is influenced by the notion that Haitians are very individualistic and have
limited social loyalty to those outside of their immediate group, and would thus not build
checkdams for those who were not participants.  It is thus important to test whether the
placement of interventions is dependent upon participation or not.
The null hypothesis that participants and non-participants held the same proportion of
parcels on which checkdams were built was rejected (see Table B.4).  In addition, the null
hypothesis that the mean number of checkdams constructed on lands held by individuals in
the participant and non-participant categories are the same was also rejected (see Table
B.4).
Though a majority of participating landholders benefitted from checkdams
constructed on their lands (66 percent of all landholding participants), checkdams were
also constructed on 28 percent of non-participating landholder lands.  Of a total of 590
checkdams constructed in the watersheds, 460 (78 percent) were constructed on participant
land and 130 (22 percent) were constructed on non-participant land.  Thus, though
participants did actually benefit disproportionately, land treatment was not precluded by
non-participation.  Field observations indicated that on numerous occasions participants
would go upstream to treat non-participant lands in order to assure the stability of
downstream treatments, and participants would occasionally treat the lands of an absent
companion.  This suggests that individuals participate to a degree corresponding roughly to30
their potential for direct economic benefit but may also contribute to non-participants
suggesting something more than narrow self-interest or expected reciprocity in the short-
term.
Further tests were therefore performed to examine the relationship between labor time
and effort contributed in terms of work events, and the degree of direct economic benefit
(see Table B.4).  These tests showed that landholders who did not actually benefit (with
checkdams on their lands) contributed the same amount of labor to the collective activity as
the landowners who did benefit.
These additional tests indicated that participation is not closely correlated with direct
economic benefit.  There was no significant difference in the amount worked by those who
benefitted and those who did not.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, participation did not
appear based on direct economic gain at least as measured in the study.  It is hypothesized
that either the non-benefitting participants benefitted in ways other than those measured,
that participants are building up "favor banks" which they expect to be reciprocated in the
future, or that other socio-cultural factors such as kin or labor exchange obligations may
also influence their decision to participate.  These will be discussed below.
(c)  Land Tenure of Parcel Held in Watershed
Haiti's mixed and largely uncodified land tenure system is claimed by many
professionals to be a major constraint to the adoption of soil conservation techniques and
overall watershed rehabilitation.  Undivided inheritance (indivize), rented (fem) and share-
cropped (demwatye) lands (representing about 47 percent of all parcels in the watersheds31
studied) are frequently defined as "insecure" tenures; and thus are not seen as potential
sites for soil conservation investment.  These conventional opinions are held despite the
paucity of research on the matter.
In the watersheds studied, the center of the ravine defined the property boundary (and
thus was jointly owned) in 14 percent of all parcels.  In these cases neither one landowner
nor the other has an explicit right or duty to treat the ravine.  This complication suggests
the prediction that ravines in this category will be less likely to be treated than ravines that
are completely owned by one individual.  We tested the hypothesis that landholders of
"insecure" parcels and jointly held ravines would participate less than those who hold
"secure" tenures and sole rights to the ravine.
Results indicated that there was no significant difference in land tenure status of
agricultural parcels held by participants and non-participants, and thus participation was
not dependent upon the land tenure arrangement of lands held in the watersheds (see Table
B.4).  Contrary to conventional assumptions, participant lands are disproportionately
"insecure" (54 percent of their lands) when compared to both the non-participant and
combined categories (39 percent and 47 percent respectively).  Further examination found
that 58 percent of all checkdams were constructed on owned land (te tit or te achte), 28
percent were constructed on undivided inheritance land (te indivize), 7 percent were
constructed on rented land (te fem), and 9 percent were constructed on crop-shared land
(demwatye).  As watersheds were categorically treated from the top-down and the skipping
of parcels was rare, and as these percentages reflect closely land tenure patterns in the
watersheds (52 percent owned, 33 percent inherited, 8 percent rented and 5 percent crop-32
shared), land tenure appears to have had little impact on the placement of ravine
treatments in the watersheds.  This finding also suggests that the "insecure" classification
is not singularly useful in determining which landholders might invest in soil conservation. 
Land "security", and willingness to invest in soil conservation is thus apparently more a
product of other variables than tenure type.
A second test indicated that there is a significant difference in the proportion of
landholders who jointly hold ravines between participants and non-participants.  Only 9
percent of participants have joint ravine tenure while 14 percent of all watershed
landholders and 20 percent of non-participants have such an arrangement.  This finding
suggests that joint ravine tenure can hinder participation in collective watershed
management efforts.  As the majority of "joint ravine tenure" cases exist in the farthest
down-stream position, this tenure complication helps explain why "down-stream"
individuals participate less than hypothesized.
(d)  Individual's Religious Affiliation
The possible correlation between religious affiliation and participation was also
examined.  Though opinions on the matter abound, to the authors' knowledge, no empirical
studies of the link from soil conservation to religious affiliation have been conducted in
Haiti.
Results indicated that participants are disproportionately Protestant, to a statistically
significant degree (see Table B.3).  Of non-participants, 83 percent expressed a Catholic
affiliation.  These results might be explained by the hypothesis that in Maissade, where 74     
12It is assumed that the vast majority of Haitians believe in some aspects of the voodoo
religion.  The people of Maissade distinguish between those who regularly practice by donating
food to ancestral spirits, and those who have ceased this practice.  It was this distinction that
was used to categorize the individuals surveyed.
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percent of all landholders are Catholic, individuals who are Protestant reject the status quo
and are active in pursuing a different tack.  This rejection of the status quo, and active
participation in watershed groups, is reinforced by the Protestant churches.  Anecdotal
evidence suggests that Protestant institutions in Haiti promote evangelicalism.  Protestant
"missions", in which groups of the devout march to other areas to preach or raise
churches, are frequently seen in the Maissade area.
Though 70 percent of all landholders regularly conduct voodoo ceremonies, 80 percent
of non-participants do the same.
12  A second test indicated that these differences are
statistically significant (see Table B.3).  Regardless of official religious affiliation, a majority
of rural Maissadeians practice voodoo.  Protestant churches (and many Protestants)
publicly claim to reject voodoo to a greater extent than the Catholic church.  The Catholic
church in Haiti is often painted by Protestants as the refuge for voodoo.  Thus, fewer
Protestants actively practice voodoo than do Catholics, and thus fewer participants and
non-watershed individuals regularly conduct voodoo ceremonies.
(e)  Individual's Wealth
With increasing wealth, the relative importance of potential benefits is decreased and
thus the potential for participation could decline.  In Haiti, increasing wealth is generally
associated with a greater tendency to rent out or crop-share lands.  This removes the
landholder from the agricultural area and thus decreases his or her potential for34
participation.
In sum, tests indicate that though the non-participant landholder population may
sometimes be wealthier than landholders who participate (indicated only by the larger
number of cows owned), there is a very significant difference in wealth status between the
non-watershed population and the combined landholder population (Table B.5).  Except
for the number of pigs owned, non-watershed individuals were categorically less wealthy
than the watershed landholders.  Thus, contrary to what might be expected, wealth does
not apparently negatively influence landholder participation.  This finding also suggests
that an element of "leadership" may be wealth, and the corresponding ability to
redistribute some of the benefits this confers.  Similarly, the poorer, non-watershed
participants made "leading" contributions of labor without explicit recognition of future
reciprocity.  Hypotheses concerning why these less-wealthy, non-watershed participants
tend to participate will be presented in the section below.
(f)  Previous Membership in Collective Action Groups
It was hypothesized that those who exhibited cooperative tendencies prior to the
initiation of the micro-watershed program would participate to a greater degree than those
that did not.
Of all watershed landholders, 57 percent are groupman members while 79 percent of
landholder participants, 29 percent of non-participants and 90 percent of non-watershed
individuals are members (see Table B.3).  These statistically significant differences in which
groupman membership correlates highly with participation, are not too surprising, since35
groupman members commonly engage in community development activities.  That 90
percent of the non-watershed participants are groupman members is striking, especially in
light of the finding that non-watershed participants contributed 57 percent of the effort. 
This finding is important as SCF had made no attempt to rally local groupman members to
participate or serve as project agents.
A second test also found a statistically significant difference between how participating
and non-participating landholders, and non-watershed participants, acquired labor for
major agricultural tasks (see Table B.3).  Approximately 90 percent of non-participating
landholders either worked their land individually or hired day labor (or both), while only
53 percent of participating landholders and 36 percent of non-watershed individuals
acquired labor in those manners.  About 46 percent of participants exchanged labor
cooperatively (either in pairs or in groups) while only 10 percent of non-participants
acquired labor in this manner.  An even greater percentage of non-watershed participants
exchanged labor (63 percent).  This high percentage of participant membership in labor
exchange indicates that labor reciprocity might be a prime incentive for non-watershed
contribution.
(g)  Individual's Age
Individual age was also tested for correlation with participation.  We hypothesized that
older people would participate less (either because of infirmity, risk aversion, or wealth)
than younger people.  
The mean age of participating landholders, non-participating holders and non-36
watershed participants was 42, 44, and 35 respectively.  The mean ages of landholding
participants and non-participants were not statistically different (see Table B.3).  The tests
also indicated that non-watershed participants were significantly younger than watershed
landholders, and that landholder participation was not correlated with age.  Other research
conducted by the author and the literature on labor exchange indicate that it is young,
land-poor males who tend to predominate in labor exchange groups (Murray 1979).  The
finding that non-watershed participants are significantly younger than landholders
corroborates the finding that 63 percent of this category participate in labor exchange, and
that they are generally less wealthy than watershed landholders.
(h)  Previous Adoption of Soil Conservation Technology
A final prediction is that an individual's previous adoption of soil conservation
practices would correlate with a potential for participation in cooperative watershed
management activities.
The proportions of individuals who have adopted techniques in each category
corresponded almost directly to those of groupman membership:  56 percent of all
landholders had adopted, while 28 percent of non-participants, 79 percent of participants,
and 87 percent of non-watershed individuals had (see Table B.3).  These differences were
statistically significant.  Participation is strongly correlated with soil and water
conservation technique adoption.  This might be due to adopters previous recognition of
soil conservation benefits, or perhaps because all adopters are groupman members. 
Whatever the case, this finding is strong evidence that the promotion of individual     
13Explanatory variables included in the logit model:  (1) age (continuous); (2) group
membership (binary); (3) technique adoption (binary); (4) religious preference (binary); (5)
participation in voodoo (binary); (6) number of checkdams constructed on parcel (continuous);
(7) land tenure type (4 categories); (8) labor acquisition type (5 categories); and (9) parcel
position type (4 categories).
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adoption of soil conservation greatly facilitates the subsequent promotion of collective
watershed management activities.
3.3 Relative Importance of Variables Associated with Individual Choice to Cooperate
The statistical analysis above indicated which variables were correlated with
cooperation, but not the relative weight of each variable.  In order to determine the relative
importance of each of the variables, a logit model with a single binary response
(cooperation or defection) was formulated.  The same database was utilized for the logit
analysis, although several variables, notably the wealth indicators, were dropped due to the
presence of zeros (i.e., nulls) in the database.  Since data for the parcel position and land
tenure variables (two of the most interesting variables) were only available for the
individuals who owned land in the watersheds, the non-watershed individuals were
excluded from the analysis.  This data reduction resulted in a total of 177 cases
(individuals) and nine variables with 19 explanatory variable columns.
13  Dummy variables
were set for the categoric data and the continuous variables were left in the original form. 
Thirteen models were tested starting with the complete model.  Variables with the highest
p-values (lowest correlation with the response ) were successively dropped from the models
considered (see Table B.6).
The model which included the groupman membership, conservation technique38
adoption and member of checkdams acquired provided the best fit of the 13 models tested. 
The other variables:  age, religious preference, voodoo practice, parcel position, labor
acquisition type, and land tenure type, were not significantly correlated to cooperation. 
The final model chosen is: y (cooperation or defection) = -1.6627 + 1.8505 (groupman
membership) + .6615 (technique adoption) + .1091 (checkdams) (see Table B.12).
The coefficients of the model chosen can be interpreted as the probability of an
individual choosing to cooperate or defect.  The results are presented graphically in
Appendix 2, Graph B-11, and also described below:
1. Groupman membership alone increases the odds of cooperation by:  e
1.8505 = 6.36
times.
2. Positive technique adoption alone increases the odds of cooperation by:  e
.6615 = 1.94
times.
3. The odds of cooperation increase by e
.1091 = 1.11 times for each checkdam
constructed on farmer land. 
4. Positive groupman membership and conservation technique adoption together
increase the odds of farmer participation by e
1.8505 + .6615 = 12.3 times.
5. Participation odds increase by e
10 * .1091 = 2.98 times when 10 checkdams were
constructed on the farmer's parcel.
6. Positive groupman membership, technique adoption and 10 checkdams together
increase the odds of farmer participation by e
1.8505 + .6615 + (10 * .1091) = 36.7 times.
These results indicate that of the variables significantly correlated with choice to     
14The "completely treated" category includes those in which the principal ravine is treated
from the uppermost parcel to the most downstream parcel.  The "partial" category includes
those in which more than one checkdam has been constructed on more than one parcel.  The
"scant" category includes those watersheds in which less than 10 treatments have been installed
on one or fewer parcels.
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cooperate, groupman membership has the strongest association, with technique adoption
and checkdam occurrence following respectively.  Positive conservation technique adoption
and positive groupman member results in the highest probability of cooperation at
checkdam levels below 16.  The positive groupman member, no conservation technique
adoption combination has the second highest probability trend (see Graph B-11).
In summary, our statistical analysis suggests that in rural Haiti, an individual choice to
cooperate in a voluntary watershed management scheme is based on (1) assurance of
reciprocated contribution (facilitated by membership in groupman); (2) knowledge of the
value of the watershed improvements resulting from this cooperation (indicated by
previous technique adoption); and (3) realization of actual short-term gain (indicated by
checkdam construction).
3.4 Conditions for a Critical Mass:  Scale, Heterogeneity and the Emergence of Collective
Action
The data was then reorganized to investigate the factors affecting the emergence of
cooperative institutions.  The watersheds were divided into three categories of treatment
achieved (complete, partial and scant) in order to represent three levels of cooperative
activity.
14  Test statistics were compared between categories to determine what conditions
affected the level of cooperation.
(a)  Watershed Resources40
The mean number of years activity, watershed area, number of landholders and parcel
size were the same in all categories (see Table B.7).  This indicated that the emergence of
cooperation was not associated with these indicators of scale and heterogeneity.  This
finding contradicts the conventional wisdom that cooperation would be constrained with
increasing watershed size and number of landholders.  Group size and heterogeneity, per
se, are here less powerful predictors of collective action than generally assumed.  One might
also assume that cooperation would be greatest where the landholders had a longer period
of time to organize the new institution.  This also was not correlated with collective action
emergence.  Nor did land tenure patterns predict well:  they were the same in all categories. 
The claim that cooperation will be greatest in watersheds where a majority of parcels were
owned outright, and that low levels of cooperation might be due to a high incidence of
short-term tenures, was not supported.
However, there was a significant difference in the pattern of parcel position in the
different categories of watersheds.  A high level of cooperation (indicated by complete
treatment) was associated with watersheds with the lowest percentage of sideslope and
downstream positions (39 percent of all parcels).  Watersheds in the partial and scant
categories exhibited a high percentage of sideslope and downstream parcels (55 and 57
percent respectively).  The presence of jointly held ravine tenures was associated with low
levels of cooperation (evidenced in the partial and scant treatment categories).  
(b)  Socio-Cultural Factors
Various socio-cultural variables also were tested by watershed category for correlation41
with the emergence of collective action (see Tables B.8, B.9 and B.10).
The mean ages of landholders and non-watershed participants was the same in all
categories.  In other words, age was not significantly correlated with the emergence of
collective action.  
The proportions of landholders who are groupman members was not the same in all
categories.  The finding that 61 percent, 45 percent, and 72 percent of landholders in the
"complete", "partial", and "scant" categories respectively were groupman members is
contrary to immediate intuition.  This means that the percentage of landholders who are
groupman members in a watershed is not correlated with the emergence of collective action. 
As we know from the above Chi-Square analysis and logit models, groupman membership
is strongly correlated with individual choice to cooperate.  This result indicates that though
there might be a minimum level of groupman membership per watershed to permit
collective action, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition.  The presence of other
contributing factors is necessary to form the "critical mass" of individuals and incentives
required for the emergence of the collective institution.
The proportion of non-watershed participants who are "groupman" members was the
same in all categories.  This percentage ranged from 87 to 100 percent.  The proportion of
landholders who are Catholic was the same across categories.  Similarly, the proportion of
non-watershed participants who are Catholic was the same across categories except at a
marginally significant level (p = .054).
All indicators of wealth, the number of pigs, cows, hectares and parcels owned, were
the same in all categories of watershed treatment.  This means that wealth (or poverty) was42
not significantly correlated with the emergence of a collective action institution.
The proportion of landholders who acquired labor in the different manners surveyed
was not the same across categories.  Where there was complete treatment, 40 percent of
individuals engaged in labor exchange arrangements (either worked in pairs or groups),
while 14 percent and 28 percent did so in the categories representing a lesser degree of
cooperation.
(c)  Technological Factors
The proportion of landholders who have adopted soil conservation techniques was not
the same in all categories of collective action.  Previous soil conservation adoption and
collective action were positively correlated.  In watersheds where there was a high degree of
cooperation 64 percent of landholders had previously adopted techniques while levels of
technique adoption were 51 percent and 41 percent in the partial and scant categories
respectively.  The proportion of non-watershed participants who have adopted soil
conservation techniques was the same in all categories.  An average of 85 percent of the
non-watershed participants had previously adopted soil conservation techniques.
(d)  Summary of Findings
The following variables were statistically significant in their association with the level
of collective action in the watersheds:
(1)  physical distribution of land parcels in the watershed;
(2)  percentage of landholders who have adopted soil conservation techniques; and43
(3)  manner in which both landholders and non-watershed participants acquire labor.
The following variables were not statistically significant in their association with the level of
collective action in the watersheds:
(1)  both landholder and non-watershed participant age;
(2)  landholder wealth (as indicated by quantity of pigs, cows, and land owned);
(3)  formal religious preference (Catholic or Protestant);
(4)  watershed size;
(5)  number of years of project activity;
(6)  number of landholders;
(7)  land tenure patterns; and the
(8) percentage of landholders who were members of pre-existing farmers groups
(groupman).
In brief, the likelihood of the emergence of collective action increases with:
(1)  the percentage of parcels that are in the up- and mid-stream position;
(2)  the percentage of landholders who have adopted conservation techniques;
(3)  the percentage of landholders who engage in labor exchange arrangements.44
4.  Conclusions:  Collective Action and Watershed Management in Haiti
4.1  Selective Incentives:  Factors Associated with Individual Choice to Cooperate
Statistical analyses were conducted to test the correlation between various socio-
economic parameters and either cooperation or defection.  Parameters which indicated the
potential for landholders to directly gain from cooperation were significantly correlated
with cooperation.  The majority of cooperators held agricultural parcels in the up-and mid-
stream positions while the majority of defectors held parcels in the sideslope and
downstream positions.  Cooperators also owned a significantly greater length of the ravine
in which the soil conservation treatments were placed.  Interestingly, holders of
downstream parcels were by and large defectors.  Research indicated that a significant
number of downstream parcels were jointly held which raised the transaction costs of
benefit distribution, and thus decreased the incentive to invest in the cooperative venture.
Tests also indicated that although cooperators tended to benefit more than defectors,
defection did not preclude the installation of checkdams on the defector's property. 
Twenty-eight percent of all checkdams were constructed on property held by defectors. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of these lands were upstream of cooperators
land, thus suggesting that downstream owners were protecting their investment by treating
upstream land.  This finding is a clear indication of the non-separabilities of watershed
production.  Though cooperators did benefit more than defectors, other tests indicate that
their was no difference in the amount of labor contributed between those who benefitted
and those who did not.  In addition, greater than 50 percent of all labor contributed to the45
collective activity came from individuals who did not hold land in the watershed.  This may
indicate that those who did not benefit within the time frame measured by the study might
benefit later, or in some other way not measured by the study.  
The holding of "insecure" tenures also did not affect the decision either to cooperate or
defect.  Both groups of individuals held the same percentage of the different land tenure
types and checkdams were constructed on land irrespective of tenure.  This finding
indicates that tenure "insecurity" is not singularly useful in determining the potential for
landholders to invest in soil conservation.  The finding also indicates that tenure
"insecurity" is essentially a question of the degree to which the investor is guaranteed of
the benefits of their investment, and that this level of security may be assured either by the
watershed management collective action or some other social institution.  Landholders of
"jointly held ravines," in contrast, did defect to a significant degree.  This tenure
arrangement was not overwhelmed by local institutional assurance and suggests that this
type of arrangement represents a limit to the effectiveness of the collective watershed
management approach.
Cooperators were disproportionally Protestant (rather than Catholic) and did not
regularly engage in voodoo despite the fact that the vast majority of landholders are
Catholic and do regularly engage in voodoo.  This indicates that in our case, the Protestants
were more willing to contribute labor to a common cause, perhaps because of sincere desire
to act philanthropically, perhaps due to their "missionary zeal" to win 46
converts, or perhaps because they take a more active role in defining their destiny than
Catholics.
Indicators of wealth were not significantly correlated with landholder cooperation or
defection in three out of four measures.  Defectors were found to own a significantly greater
number of cows than cooperators.  Except for the number of pigs owned (all categories
owned the same number of pigs), non-watershed cooperators were categorically less
wealthy than all watershed landholders.  Thus, wealth does not apparently reduce the
incentive to cooperate.  Rather, relative wealth corresponds to a greater ability to
contribute, and such contributions might be an act of "leadership".  Conversely, poverty
may be a factor which causes non-watershed holders to make contributions to the collective
cause, despite delayed or uncertain returns, creating a critical mass of labor contribution
which may then be reciprocated.  It is interesting to note that in cash-poor Haiti, labor is
both the medium of exchange between farmers, and the only asset which the poor can
contribute to a collective effort.  As anthropologist G. Murray noted, in Haiti "...the
farmers success in life entails not only the acquisition of land, but the systematic
mobilization of the energies of other individuals as well... Much of his behavior will not be
understood however, unless his radical dependence on the labor of others is clearly
perceived..." (Murray 1977).
Membership in groupman farmers organizations was strongly correlated with
cooperation and non-membership strongly correlated with defection.  In addition, the vast
majority of non-watershed cooperators were groupman members (90 percent).  Similarly
the vast majority of defectors either worked their land individually or hired labor, while47
cooperators tended to exchange labor to a much greater degree.  The majority of non-
watershed cooperators also participated in labor exchange arrangements.  This findings
indicated that cooperators tend to be members of reciprocity-based social institutions while
defectors are not, reflecting both individual preference and the assurance of reciprocated
investment.
There was no difference in average age between cooperating and defecting landholders
but non-watershed cooperators were significantly younger.  This finding is understandable
as non-watershed participants also tended to be both poorer and members of labor
exchange groups.
A logit model was constructed to assess the relative weight of the parameters in their
association with cooperation or defection.  When compared, previous membership in
groupman had the strongest association with choice to cooperate, with previous adoption of
soil conservation second, and the actual benefit of checkdams constructed on the
landowners land third.  None of the other parameters discussed above were significantly
correlated with cooperation at this aggregate level.  This finding strongly indicates that
choice to cooperate is largely based upon (in descending order) an individual's:  (1) "group
spiritedness" and assurance for a reciprocated contribution (facilitated by groupman
membership); (2) knowledge of the significant value of the good being created through
collective action (indicated by previous adoption of soil conservation); and (3) the
realization of actual short-term gain.48
4.2 Conditions for a Critical Mass:  Factors Associated with the Emergence of Collective
Action
Watershed size, tenure type distribution, the number of years of activity and the
number of landholders were not associated with the emergence (or the lack of) collective
action.  More importantly, increases in these parameters (indicators of watershed
heterogeneity) did not constrain collective action.  In terms of watershed resources, only the
distribution of parcel location (an indicator of potential for economic gain) was correlated
with collective action.  Collective action was facilitated by greater levels of potential for
economic gain (indicated by increased numbers of parcels in the up- and mid-stream
position).  The transaction costs of creating a new collective action institution only
appeared to be worth bearing in cases in which the potential for gain overwhelmed the
cost.  In short, when the externality is large enough is it more worth internalizing (i.e., since
the potential welfare gain is large).
Indicators of landholder heterogeneity (levels of: wealth, age, religious preference,
groupman membership) were not important constraints to the emergence of collective
action.  Increasing socio-economic diversity did not lead to reduced levels of collective
action.  These findings suggest either that the population was relatively homogenous in
these parameters (at the level tested) or that a high degree of assurance existed in the
community which overcame the risk and uncertainty associated with heterogeneity.  In
terms of landholder heterogeneity, only the percentage of landholders who had previously
adopted techniques and the percentage of landholders who engaged in labor exchange49
arrangements were correlated with the emergence of collective action.  As these percentages
increased, so did the level of collective action.  These findings suggest that knowledge of the
value of the collective objective (installing soil conservation treatments) greatly increased
the adoption of the collective, watershed management innovation.
It is worth noting, that though groupman membership was the parameter most
strongly correlated with individual choice to cooperate, it was not found to be correlated
with the level of collective action.  In fact, the lowest level of action was correlated with the
highest level of groupman membership.  This suggests that groupman membership is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for action.  All of the watersheds tested were
apparently above the minimum level of groupman representation.
Groupman and labor exchange groups are the primary institutional norms of
cooperative activity and are probably the primary facilitators of both the adoption and
diffusion of the cooperative watershed management innovation.  The strength of these
indigenous institutions override population heterogeneity and the linkages based on
physical proximity.  A high degree of assurance over reciprocated contributions and
reduced transaction costs permits members to make "leading" contributions to the
collective, thus making these institutions the social basis for collective action and self-
governance.
4.3 Implications for Collective Action Theory:  Explanations and Extensions
1. Participants will voluntarily treat non-participant land.  Twenty-eight percent of
all checkdams were constructed on non-participant land.  This is the clearest     
15Ravi Kanbur (1992) has recently presented a similar idea:  that ulterior motives (side-
payments) can contribute to the critical mass and permit formation of an institution.  In our case
a predominant alterior motive was the acquisition of labor.  Membership in groupman and labor
exchange groups are -- to use his term -- "conduits" for side payments.
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indicator of the non-separability of watershed production.
2. The majority of cooperators did not gain (at least as measured by the study) within
the two years of study.  The majority thus sub-optimized as they contributed their
labor but did not gain directly and economically in the short-run.  This does not
suggest irrationality, but a larger set of arguments and longer period of time over
which reciprocity is likely to occur.
3. Watershed and landholder heterogeneity did not constrain cooperation because
the high degree of membership in groupman and labor exchange groups permitted
a high degree of assurance concerning rule conformance and reciprocity.  In
addition, the fact that all individuals, rich or poor, had scattered plots engenders a
uniformity of interest (i.e., homogeneity in the potential to gain) in watershed
management.  
4. Rather than thinking of a collective action institutions as one which solves a single
public good problem, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of such an institution
as a "bundle of opportunities", one which solves different problems for different
individuals.
15  Some individuals might cooperate in order to gain social prestige,
another might cooperate in order to build up labor debts which would be
reciprocated in a labor scarce season, and another might cooperate in order to51
reap short-term financial gains.  In any case, the collective action unit is an
aggregation of the labor invested by diverse individuals for diverse reasons, only
part of which is the resolution of the externality.  Though the potential for an
adequate level of financial gain is necessary for group initiation, these alterior
motives for cooperation might eventually be more important (in terms of providing
incentives and resulting in effort) than the resolution of the original public good
problem.
4.4 Implications for Policy
1. Free riding is not a dominant strategy, rather it is conditional upon pre-existing
social relationships and the potential for economic gain.  On the contrary,
individuals within and beyond the watersheds flocked to cooperate in the new,
collective activity.  The cooperative watershed management effort represented the
opportunity for new wealth and reciprocated labor investments.  Defection
dominated where individuals were not groupman, or labor exchange group
members, and where they jointly held a segment of the watershed ravine.
The finding that cooperation is conditional on the expected behavior of others
contradicts a strong individualist assumption made by conventional policy and
project interventions in Haiti.
2. Under the right conditions, the poor will voluntarily donate labor for watershed
management.  Contrary to conventional wisdom the poor are not too poor to
participate (or cooperate).  As evidenced by this study, the poor will make52
substantial contributions if effort is within a framework for assured reciprocation.
3. In our case self-governance was limited by:  (1) the percentage of holders who
participate in labor exchange arrangements; (2) the percentage of holders who had
previously adopted soil conservation techniques; and (3) the percentage of parcels
in the watershed that are in the up- and mid-stream positions.  In short, the
collective action approach to watershed management worked upstream of jointly
held parcels.  It suggests that one low-cost policy would be to encourage self-
governance where feasible, facilitating interaction between landholders, settling
disputes and providing legal guarantees for contractual arrangements (Tang,
1992).  In short, policy instruments (subsidies or investments) could "fill the gap"
between the capability of local institutions and the level of contribution needed to
supply the public good.  Such an approach, although problematic in terms of
monitoring, would be low-cost, and enhance local institutional capabilities to
manage their development.  For example, cooperative watershed management
upstream could be used as a precondition for government subsidy of public works
downstream.  The treatment of upland watersheds in Haiti would be promoted by
project and policy support of the spread of labor exchange arrangements; prior
adoption of soil conservation treatments.  Government support of groupman
membership would also forward collective action.  Labor exchange groups could be
used as the basis for extension networks.  Government oppression of groupman53
and other local institutions reduces the ability of rural Haitians to adequately
manage their lands, and has an indirect but substantial negative impacts on the
rural environment.
4. Short-term and "insecure" land tenure arrangements did not hinder the
installation of either the soil conservation practices or the adoption of the
watershed management activity.  As stated previously, labor substitutes for cash as
the primary medium of exchange between peasants, and access to labor in times of
need is thus effectively more important than tenure terms or cash.  This need for
labor can overwhelm potential disputes and social friction caused by unfairly
administered tenure.  In short, these types of tenure are social accommodations to
uncertainty.  If the level of assurance can be increased (via reciprocal institutions),
then the "problem" of tenure diminishes.
5. Though watershed-specific management groups are not always formed, complete
ravine treatment is possible.  In sum, different levels of net gain, watershed and
landholder heterogeneity will result in different institutional formations.  Resource
management can be achieved despite watershed and landholder diversity.55
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Appendix A
Theoretical Review:  Conditions for Cooperation or Defection
Consider Figure 1a, in which two linear payoff curves are drawn for a village population of
n + 1, reflecting the benefits of cooperation and defection in an interdependent watershed. 
These are the payoffs to the (n + 1)th agent:  farmer 1, where n equals the number of other
resource users.  Hence, the graphs reflect the decision calculus faced by an individual farmer: 
to defect or cooperate?  The upper curve corresponds to the dominant choice of defection D. 
Its left end is labeled 0, the open access equilibrium, in which no agents cooperate and the
benefits of management are driven to zero.  The D curve rises monotonically to the right. 
Below it is the dominated cooperation strategy C, which also begins at the open access
equilibrium 0, rises monotonically and crosses the axis at point k where positive gains to
cooperation begin.  The number choosing to cooperate in Figure 1 is denoted by the distance
along the horizontal axis.
The vertical axis of Figure 1 shows the payoff to cooperation by farmer 1 when a certain
number of others choose to cooperate with the watershed management regime and the
remainder defect.  At k = n/2 in Figure 1a, for example, positive gains are made by
cooperators whenever at least half of the other agents also cooperate.  Because D lies
everywhere above C, it is a strictly dominant strategy.  Monotonicity of both curves in the same
direction implies that cooperation leads to uniformly positive externalities, and defection to
uniformly negative externalities.  The C curve is higher on the right than the D curve on the left,
reflecting the Pareto-inefficiency of the dominant defection strategy.  The dotted lines show
total (or average) values corresponding to theA - 3 
number of agents choosing the two strategies, and point m represents the maximum collective
payoff for the group.  The slope of these schedules may be interpreted as the marginal payoff to
defection and cooperation.
In Figure 1a, D rises more rapidly than C, indicating that the more agents who join the
cooperative coalition, the greater is the advantage of defecting.  The collective maximum at
point m is achieved with some agents choosing D and some C.  Point m falls to the right of k
on the horizontal axis.  This implies that collective gains are greater when there are more than k
cooperators, and that these gains reach a maximum at point m, and diminish thereafter.
In Figure 1b, the slopes of the C and D functions reflect an alternative incentive structure,
in which the proposed watershed management regime achieves most of its benefits after about
half of the population participates, after which benefits increase at a decreasing rate and
ultimately decrease after reaching a maximum of m.  The collective maximum occurs at about
two-thirds participation, with room for gains to cooperators from point k to point m along the
horizontal axis.  Cases 1a and 1b represent two of an infinite number of possible variations on
the case in which defection strictly dominates, making some form of coercion necessary to solve
the problem of externalities and public goods.  These are all examples of the Prisoners'
Dilemma (PD).  Restrictive rules and the level of coercion accompanying them alter the payoffs,
and thus the level and shape, of the C and D schedules.
Consider the more complex and arguably more realistic case in which neither C nor D
represents a strictly dominant strategy.  Figure 2 shows a situation in which a linear D A - 5 
curve dominates a linear C curve until point y, after which C dominates D.  The absence of a
dominant strategy raises the problem of coordinating the expectations of a "critical mass" of
agents around a particular watershed management regime.  In Figure 2, there are two
equilibria; one at 0 and one at z.  The problem of coordination is to achieve the Pareto-superior
equilibrium at z.  In cases such as these, the coalition must move beyond k to the switch point
y; otherwise, defection will dominate and lead to the Pareto-inferior equilibrium at 0.  Unlike
the PD, in which defection dominates at all levels of participation, implying a continual need for
outside coercion, this situation rests on the contingent strategies of agents.  If enough people in
a village are assured that others will cooperate, then z will emerge as the equilibrium. 
However, if a Pareto-inferior open-access equilibrium has become established, no agent will
decide to join a coalition subscribing to a watershed management rule unless he expects a
sufficient number of others to do so.  Achieving a Pareto-superior solution will require an
organized change in behavior leading a critical mass to cooperate with the watershed
management scheme.
Achieving this level of cooperation may require some kind of outside enforcement (or
subsidy) mechanism.  If the situation resembles Figure 2, however, relatively little enforcement
from outside may be necessary to organize a change in behavior.  Voluntary cooperation with
the watershed management scheme inside the group of watershed users may even be sufficient. 
As Hayek (1948) argued, in many cases spontaneous recognition of the need for organized
collective action occurs on the part of the affected group simply because the payoff to such
organization is substantial.     
1This type of behavior has been suggested in the case of African grazing by Swallow (19__).
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In Figure 3, point x is the threshold for cooperation for farmer 1, while point y is the "point




Table B.1.  Description of Participation and Effort in Watersheds Studied.
Parameters     Watersheds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Mean S.D
Initial year of activity. 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 / /
No. landholder participants. 4 5 4 7 2 8 6 3 6 2 3 2 4 8 4 4 1 7 9 3 4 5 4.6 2.2
No. non-wsd participants. 1 5 3 8 3 1 10 2 6 4 3 5 6 3 12 2 5 0 0 3 0 0 3.7 3.2
No. landholder person/work events. 45 37 9 21 16 242 62 8 35 24 26 3 8 38 11 12 5 38 25 12 12 19 / /
No. non-wsd person/work events. 14 8 8 18 10 33 135 6 14 33 31 11 9 17 26 5 16 0 0 13 0 0 / /
No. work events in wsd ravine. 0/14 5/5 4/0 2/2 4/7 28/5 11/4 3 13 10 11 3 3 10 4 3 5 8 8 4 0 6 9/6 10/4
No. work events outside wsd. 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/7 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 .6 1.7
Do wsd groups plan to work in other wsds
(1=yes; 0=no)?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Did participants work collectively in the
same group prior to program?
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .4
Did participants work collectively in
various groups prior to program?
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 .6 .5
No. checkdams in wsd. 9 26 9 35 19 85 92 2 34 13 12 16 36 54 20 12 9 16 35 20 16 20 26.8 23.3
Notes:
1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey conducted in August and September, 1990.
2. Watershed code. 1) Do Pye Moris (1); 2) Do Bwa Pen; 3) Savan a Palm; 4) Zeb Razwa; 5) Paloat; 6) Nan
Manwel; 7) Met Pye; 8) Dlo Kontre; 9) Larik; 10) Do Pye Moris (2); 11) La Guam; 12) Vikam; 13) Zeb
Gine; 14) Savan a Palm (Talma); 15) Tidjo; 16) Perikit; 17) Fond Pikan; 18) Nan Silinn (LSY); 19)
Basya; 20) Ba Simitye; 21) Nan Silinn (MJ); 22) Nan Nikola.
3. The first and second numbers in the work events colunms indicate events in 1989 and 1990 respectively.B - 2
Table B.2.  Physical and Socio-economic Characteristics of Watersheds Studied.
Parameters     Watersheds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Mean S.D
Wsd area (has). 4.8 3.6 11.3 3.7 9.1 20.1 8.4 4.0 22.8 8.1 / 5.3 5.7 34.2 6.0 2.1 4.0 3.6 19.1 3.1 5.3 3.7 9.0 8.3
No. land parcels. 6 5 12 14 8 14 15 5 8 5 4 4 10 20 6 5 5 7 17 4 14 7 8.9 4.8
No. land holders. 6 5 11 13 8 14 14 5 7 5 4 4 9 20 4 5 5 7 16 4 13 7 8.5 4.6
Mean parcel size (has). 1.0 .6 .4 .5 .3 1.0 .5 .8 .6 / / .4 .3 1.6 .5 / / 1.0 1.0 / .9 / .72 .35
No. parcels with long-term
tenure arrangements.
6 4 10 9 7 13 12 4 8 5 4 3 10 19 2 3 5 7 14 3 13 6 7.6 4.4
No. parcels with short-
term tenure arrangements.
0 1 2 5 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 2 0 0 3 1 2 1 1.3 1.4
Mean slope of parcels (%). 10 5 15 6 30 34 8 6 7 / / 6 4 4 7 / / 17 34 / 6 / 12.4 10.7
Length of principal ravine
(m).
237 413 455 497 432 1061 417 254 465 / / 282 337 / 198 190 / 659 717 274 313 / 424 222
Notes:
1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey conducted in August and September, 1990.
2. Watershed code. 1) Do Pye Moris (1); 2) Do Bwa Pen; 3) Savan a Palm; 4) Zeb Razwa; 5) Paloat; 6) Nan
Manwel; 7) Met Pye; 8) Dlo Kontre; 9) Larik; 10) Do Pye Moris (2); 11) La Guam; 12) Vikam; 13) Zeb
Gine; 14) Savan a Palm (Talma); 15) Tidjo; 16) Perikit; 17) Fond Pikan; 18) Nan Silinn (LSY); 19)
Basya; 20) Ba Simitye; 21) Nan Silinn (MJ); 22) Nan Nikola.
3. Mean parcel size was converted from fractions of "carreaux" (1 "carreau" = 1.29 hectares) as reported
by landholders.  As landholders do not know the precise size of their holdings, these means are
approximations.
4. Long-term tenure arrangements include purchased ("te achte, te tit"), divided ("te erite"), and
undivided inheritance lands ("te indivize").
5. Short-term tenure arrangements include rented ("te fem, pretansyon", and crop-shared ("demwatye").B - 3
DATA:  FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTICIPATION DATA:  FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTICIPATION









 No. of individuals in each category. 85 101 186 82
 % who are "groupman" members. 29 79 57 90
 % who have adopted soil conservation techniques. 28 79 56 87
 % who are female. 6 5 5 10
 % who are Catholic (complementary % expressed a Protestant
affiliation).
83 65 74 63
 % who regularly conduct "voodoo" ceremonies. 80 61 70 57
 Manner in which individuals conduct major
 agricultural tasks (labor acquisition):
   % who work individually ("pou kont yo"):
   % who work in pairs ("boukante maten"):
   % who work cooperatively ("asosye"):
   % who hire day labor ("bay djob"):





















 Mean age (standard deviation in parentheses). 44(14) 41(11) 42(13) 35(11)
Notes:
1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of all watershed landholders and all management activity participants in the 22 watersheds.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis: The X
2 statistic was used to compare variable proportions between categories and types for the categorical data (expressed in this table as %).
Test 1 The HO that true proportions of individuals who are "groupman" members are the same in the non-participant, participant and non-watershed categories was rejected (X
2 = 75.; p = 0.000; df = 2).
Test 2 The HO that true proportions of individuals who have adopted soil conservation techniques are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 76.5; p = 0.000; df = 2). 
Test 3 The HO that true proportions of individuals who express a Catholic religious affiliation are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 10.2; p = 0.006; df = 2).
Test 4 The HO that true proportions of individuals who regularly conduct "voodoo" ceremonies are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 11.1; p = 0.004; df = 2).
Test 5 The HO that true proportions of individuals who acquire labor in similar manners are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 59.4; p = 0.000; df = 8).
3. Statistical analysis: A two-tailed Z-test was used to test hypotheses that mean ages are the same between categories of individuals.
Test 1 The HO that the mean age of individuals in the non-participant and participant categories are the same was accepted (p = 0.110).
Test 2 The HO that the mean age of individuals in the non-participant and non-watershed categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 3 The HO that the mean age of individuals in the participant and non-watershed categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.025).B - 4
DATA:  FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTICIPATION








No. of individuals in each category. 85 101 186 82
% of holders who benefited checkdams. 28 66 49 0
Mean no. of checkdams constructed per parcel. 2(3) 4(5) 3(4) 0
Tenure status of parcels held in watershed:
   % owned ("tit" or "achte"):
   % undivided inheritance ("indivize"):
   % rented ("fem" or "pretansyon"):

















Position of parcel in watershed:
   % sideslope (i.e. no ravine on parcel):
   % upstream (i.e. top of ravine):
   % midstream (i.e. mid-ravine):

















Mean length of ravine owned: 55(37) 68(44) 62(45) /
% of individuals with joint ownership of ravine: 20 9 14 /
Mean no. of work events in which individuals participated: those who
benefited checkdams:










1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of all watershed landholders and all management activity participants in the 22 watersheds.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis:  The X
2 statistic was used to compare proportions between categories and types indicated with categorical data (expressed here as %).
Test 1 The HO that true proportions of landholders who benefited checkdams are the same for non-participant and participant landholders was rejected (X
2 = 26.8; p = 0.000; df = 1). 
Test 2 The HO that true proportions of tenure status types are the same for non-participant and participant landholders was accepted (X
2 = 5.09; p = 0.165; df = 3).
Test 3 The HO that true proportions of parcel position types are the same for both categories for non-participant and participant landholders was rejected (X
2 = 17.0; p = 0.001; df = 3).
Test 4 The HO that true proportions of individuals with jointly held ravine parcels are the same for both non-participant and participant landholders was rejected (X
2 = 4.72; p = 0.030; df = 1).
3. Statistical analysis: A two-tailed Z-test was used to test the hypotheses that variable means are the same for the all categories of individuals.
Test 1 The HO that the mean no. of checkdams constructed on participant and non-participant lands are the same was rejected (p = 0.001).
Test 2 The HO that the mean length of ravine owned by participants and non-participants is the same was rejected (p = 0.029).
Test 3 The HO that the mean no. of work events worked by participants who directly benefitted and those who did not was accepted (p = 0.157).
Test 4 The HO that the mean no. of work events worked by participants who did not directly benefit and non-wsd participants was accepted (p = 0.386).
Test 5 The HO that the mean no. of work events worked by participants who directly benefited and non-wsd participants was rejected (p = 0.008).B - 5
DATA:  FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTICIPATION









No. of individuals in each category. 85 101 186 82
Mean no. of parcels held ("tit" or "indivize").  3(1) 3(2) 3(2) 2(1)
Mean no. of hectares held ("tit" or "indivize"). 2.2(2.1) 2.8(6.5) 2.5(5.0) 1.6(1.3)
Mean no. of cows owned. 2(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(1)
Mean no. of pigs owned. 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Notes:
1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of all watershed landholders and all management activity participants in the 22 watersheds studied.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis: A two-tailed Z-test was used to test the hypotheses that variable means are the same for the all categories of individuals.
Test 1 The HO that the mean no. of parcels held by individuals in the participant and non-wsd categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 2 The HO that the mean no. of parcels held by individuals in the non-participant and non-wsd categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 3 The HO that the mean no. of hectares held by individuals in the participant and non-participant categories are the same was accepted (p = 0.523).
Test 4 The HO that the mean no. of hectares held by individuals in the participant and non-wsd categories are the same was accepted (p = 0.070).
Test 5 The HO that the mean no. of hectares held by individuals in the non-participant and non-wsd categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.026).
Test 6 The HO that the mean no. of cows owned by individuals in the participant and non-participant categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 7 The HO that the mean no. of cows owned by individuals in the non-participant and non-wsd categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.000).B - 6
Table B.6.  Logit Models Tested





age, group membership, land tenure, labor type, religious
preference, voodoo participation, checkdam construction, parcel
position, technique adoption 164.2 160 >.05 21.2
age, group membership, land tenure, labor type, voodoo
participation, checkdam construction, parcel position, technique
adoption 164.2 161 >.05 19.2
age, group membership, land tenure, labor type, checkdam
construction, parcel position, technique adoption 164.2 162 >.05 17.2
group membership, land tenure, labor type, checkdam construction,
parcel position, technique adoption 164.3 163 >.05 15.3
group membership, labor type, checkdam construction, parcel
position, technique adoption 165.0 166 >.05 10.
group membership, labor type, checkdam construction, technique
adoption 168.6 169 >.05 7.6
group membership, checkdam construction, technique adoption 172.9 173 >.05 3.9
group membership, technique adoption 180.8 174 .005 9.8
group membership, checkdam construction 182.9 174 .001 11.9
checkdam construction, technique adoption 192.6 174 <.001 21.6
group membership, checkdam construction, technique adoption,
membership/adoption interaction 171.4 172 .498 4.4
group membership, checkdam construction, technique adoption,
adoption/checkdams interaction 170.8 172 .147 3.8
group membership, checkdam construction, technique adoption,
membership/checkdams interaction 172.2 172 .402 5.2B - 7
Factors Associated with the Emergence of Cooperative Action
Table B.7.  Profiles of Watersheds With Different Levels




No. of watersheds (wsd) in category. 10 7 5
Mean no. years activity. 1.3(.5) 1.3(.5) 1.4(.5)
Mean wsd area (standard deviation in parentheses). 7.7(6.5) 13.1(12.6) 6.4(3.2)
Mean no. of landholders in wsd. 9.0(4.8) 9.1(5.6) 6.4(2.6)
Mean parcel size. .60(.28) .83(.45) .73(.30)
Mean no. of ravine treatments. 37.1(28.9) 25.3(14.7) 8.4(4.0)
Tenure status of land parcels in wsd:
  % owned ("tit" or "achte"):
  % undivided inheritance ("indivize"):
  % rented ("fem" or "pretansyon"):













Parcel position in wsd:
  % sideslope (i.e. no ravine owned):
  % upstream (i.e. top of ravine):
  % midstream (i.e. mid-ravine):














1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of all watershed landholders in each of the 22
watersheds.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis: The small sample, two-tailed t-test was used to test hypotheses that means are the
same between the complete, partial and scant categories.
Test 1 The HO that the mean no. years activity in the complete and scant treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .690). 
Test 2 The HO that the mean wsd area in the complete and scant treatment categories are the same was accepted
(p = .683). 
Test 3 The HO that the mean wsd area in the complete and partial treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .264). 
Test 4 The HO that the mean wsd area in the scant and partial treatment categories are the same was accepted
(p = .277). 
Test 5 The HO that the mean no. of landholders in the scant and partial treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .345). 
Test 6 The HO that the mean no. of landholders in the complete and partial treatment categories are the same
was accepted (p = .969). 
Test 7 The HO that the mean no. of landholders in the complete and scant treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .284). 
Test 8 The HO that the mean parcel size in the complete and scant treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .422). 
Test 9 The HO that the mean parcel size in the complete and partial treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .213). 
Test 10 The HO that the mean parcel size in the scant and partial treatment categories are the same was
accepted (p = .676). 
3. Statistical analysis:  The X
2 statistic was used to compare variable proportions between the complete,
scant and partial categories for the categorical data (expressed in this table in % terms).
Test 1 The HO that true proportions of land tenure types are the same in all categories was accepted (X
2 =
7.19; p = .307; df = 6).
Test 2 The HO that true proportions of parcel position types are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 =
15.02; p = .020; df = 6).B - 8
Factors Associated with the Emergence of Cooperative Action
Table B.8.  Profiles of Cooperation in Watersheds




No. of watersheds (wsd) in category. 10 7 5
Mean total person/work events worked by landholders. 41.5(72.2) 28.8(10.9) 18.2(16.7)
Mean total person/work events worked by non-wsd
participants.
25.0(40.1) 11.4(10.8) 15.4(10.7)
Mean no. landholders/work event. 4.3(1.6) 2.8(1.2) 2.2(.8)
Mean no. of non-wsd participants/work event. 2.9(2.3) 1.7(1.1) 2.3(.9)
% of landholders who participated. 58 55 44
% of landholders who directly benefited (with
checkdams constructed on their parcel).
64 39 25
% of landholders who could have directly benefited.
(including upstream, midstream and downstream parcel
positions).
73 78 59
% of landholders who could have directly benefited
(excluding those with jointly held ravines).
65 51 53
% of landholders who directly benefited (excluding
those with jointly held ravines).
58 37 25
Notes:
1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of the watershed management activity in each of
the 22 watersheds.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis: The small sample, two-tailed t-test was used to test hypotheses that means are the
same between the complete, partial and scant categories.
Test 1 The HO that the mean no. of landholders per work event in the complete and scant treatment categories
are the same was accepted (p = .054). 
Test 2 The HO that the mean no. of landholders per work event in the complete and partial treatment categories
are the same was rejected (p = .017). 
Test 3 The HO that the mean no. of landholders per work event in the scant and partial treatment categories
are the same was accepted (p = .345). 
Test 4 The HO that the mean no. of non-wsd participants per work event in the scant and partial treatment
categories are the same was accepted (p = .341). 
Test 5 The HO that the mean no. of non-wsd participants per work event in the complete and partial treatment
categories are the same was accepted (p = .223). 
Test 6 The HO that the mean no. of non-wsd participants per work event in the complete and scant treatment
categories are the same was accepted (p = .589). 
3. Statistical analysis:  The X
2 statistic was used to compare variable proportions between the complete,
scant and partial categories for the categorical data (expressed in this table in % terms).
Test 1 The HO that true proportions of landholders who participated are the same in all categories was
accepted (X
2 = 1.88; p = .391; df = 2).
Test 2 The HO that true proportions of landholders who directly benefitted are the same in all categories was
rejected (X
2 = 20.36; p = <.001; df = 2).
Test 3 The HO that true proportions of landholders who directly benefitted (excluding those with jointly held
ravines are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 12.55; p = .002; df = 2).B - 9
Factors Associated with the Emergence of Cooperative Action
Table B.9.  Social Profiles of Watershed Landholders and Non-Watershed




No. of watersheds (wsd) in category. 10 7 5
Mean age of wsd landholders. 41(12.5) 43(13.9) 44(13.3)
Mean age of non-wsd participants. 33(10.0) 36(10.5) 38(13.0)
% of holders who are "groupman" members. 61 45 72
% of non-wsd participants who are "groupman"
members.
87 100 93
% of holders who have adopted soil
conservation techniques.
64 51 41
% of non-wsd participants who have adopted
soil conservation techniques.
87 95 73
% of holders who are Catholic. 75 72 72
% of non-wsd participants who are Catholic. 74 50 47
% of holders who regularly conduct "voodoo"
ceremonies.
77 59 72




1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of all watershed landholders in each of the 22
watersheds.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis: The small sample, two-tailed t-test was used to test hypotheses that means are the
same between the complete, partial and scant categories.
Test 1 The HO that the mean age of wsd landholders in the complete and scant treatment categories are the same
was accepted (p = .680). 
Test 2 The HO that the mean age of wsd landholders in the partial and scant treatment categories are the same
was accepted (p = .903). 
Test 3 The HO that the mean age of wsd landholders in the complete and partial treatment categories are the
same was accepted (p = .761). 
Test 4 The HO that the mean age of non-wsd participants in the scant and partial treatment categories are the
same was accepted (p = .774). 
Test 5 The HO that the mean age of non-wsd participants in the scant and complete treatment categories are the
same was accepted (p = .427). 
Test 6 The HO that the mean age of non-wsd participants in the complete and partial treatment categories are
the same was accepted (p = .560). 
3. Statistical analysis:  The X
2 statistic was used to compare variable proportions between the complete,
scant and partial categories for the categorical data (expressed in this table in % terms).
Test 1 The HO that true proportions of holders who are "groupman" members are the same in all categories was
rejected (X
2 = 7.08; p = .029; df = 2).
Test 2 The HO that true proportions of non-wsd participants who are "groupman" members are the same in all
categories was accepted (X
2 = 3.01; p = .222; df = 2).
Test 3 The HO that true proportions of holders who have adopted soil conservation techniques are the same in
all categories was rejected (X
2 = 6.18; p = .045; df = 2).
Test 4 The HO that true proportions of non-wsd participants who have adopted soil conservation techniques are
the same in all categories was accepted (X
2 = 3.50; p = .173; df = 2).
Test 5 The HO that true proportions of holders who are Catholic are the same in all categories was accepted
(X
2 = .324; p = .850; df = 2).
Test 6 The HO that true proportions of non-wsd participants who are Catholic are the same in all categories
was accepted (X
2 = 5.84; p = .054; df = 2).
Test 7 The HO that true proportions of holders who conduct "voodoo" ceremonies are the same in all categories
was accepted (X
2 = 5.39; p = .068; df = 2).
Test 8 The HO that true proportions of non-wsd participants who conduct "voodoo" ceremonies are the same in
all categories was rejected (X
2 = 10.25; p = .006; df = 2).B - 10
Factors Associated with the Emergency of Cooperative Action
Table B.10.  Wealth Profiles of Watershed Landholders and Non-Watershed




No. of watersheds (wsd) in category. 10 7 5
Mean no. of parcels held by wsd holders. 3(5) 3(3) 2(2)
Mean no. of hectares held by wsd holders. 3.2(59.6) 2.1(3.5) 2.1(5.1)
Mean no. of cows owned by wsd holders. 1(9) 1(2) 2(14)
Mean no. of pigs owned by wsd holders. 1(1) 1(1) 1(2)
Manner in which holders conduct major
agricultural tasks:
  % who work individually ("pou kont yo"):
  % who work in pairs ("boukante maten"):
  % who work cooperatively ("asosye"):
  % who hire day labor ("bay djob"):
















Manner in which non-wsd individuals conduct
major agricultural tasks:
  % who work individually ("pou kont yo"):
  % who work in pairs ("boukante maten"):
  % who work cooperatively ("asosye"):
  % who hire day labor ("bay djob"):

















1. Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of all watershed landholders in each of the 22
watersheds.  Data was collected in December, 1990.
2. Statistical analysis: The small sample, two-tailed t-test was used to test hypotheses that means are the
same between the complete, partial and scant categories.
Test 1 The HO that the mean no. of parcels held by wsd holders in the complete and scant treatment categories
are the same was accepted (p = .679). 
Test 2 The HO that the mean no. of parcels held by wsd holders in the complete and partial treatment
categories are the same was accepted (means are equal). 
Test 3 The HO that the mean no. of parcels held by wsd holders in the partial and scant treatment categories
are the same was accepted (p = .533). 
Test 4 The HO that the mean no. of hectares held by wsd holders in the scant and partial treatment categories
are the same was accepted (means are equal). 
Test 5 The HO that the mean no. of hectares held by wsd holders in the complete and partial treatment
categories are the same was accepted (p = .845). 
Test 6 The HO that the mean no. of hectares held by wsd holders in the complete and scant treatment categories
are the same was accepted (p = .969). 
Test 7 The HO that the mean no. of cows owned by wsd holders in the complete and scant treatment categories
are the same was accepted (p = .868). 
Test 8 The HO that the mean no. of cows owned by wsd holders in the complete and partial treatment categories
are the same was accepted (means are equal). 
Test 9 The HO that the mean no. of cows owned by wsd holders in the partial and scant treatment categories are
the same was accepted (p = .934). 
Test 10 The HO that the mean no. of pigs owned by wsd holders was the same in all categories was accepted
(means are equal). 
3. Statistical analysis:  The X
2 statistic was used to compare variable proportions between the complete,
scant and partial categories for the categorical data (expressed in this table in % terms).
Test 1 The HO that the true proportions of wsd landholders who conduct major agricultural tasks in the same
manner are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 21.1; p = .007; df = 8).
Test 2 The HO that the true proportions of non-wsd landholders who conduct major agricultural tasks in the
same manner are the same in all categories was rejected (X
2 = 21.4; p = .006; df = 8).B - 11





(Coefficient) z p Deviance
Degrees of
freedom
 Intercept -1.6627 .36986 -4.5 <.0001 245.1 176
 "Groupman"
  Membership 1.8505 .42900 4.31 <.0001 / /
 Conservation
 Technique
 Adoption .6615 .20771 3.18 .0015 / /
 Checkdam
 Quantity .1091 .04112 2.65 .0080 172.9 173